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When placed strategically, campaign field offices can be very
important in turning battleground states during presidential
elections.
The rise of social media, online campaigning and big data techniques has put a new spin on
the traditional ‘ground game’ in political campaigns. Using data from the 2008 and 2012
presidential elections, Joshua Darr and Matthew Levendusky investigate why campaign
field offices are located where they are, and whether or not they can make a difference in
elections. They find that, through strategic placement, Obama’s field offices accounted for as
much as 50 percent of his margin of victory in some states. They argue that in an era of billion
dollar campaigns, field offices offer a cost effective way to mobilize voters and leave a legacy
of local volunteers.
American polit ical campaigns now use many more methods f or f inding and contacting voters
than at any point in American history. Much has been written on the roles of  technology, big
data, and social media in recent campaigns, but there has been a corresponding rise in old-
f ashioned campaign techniques—particularly establishing campaign f ield of f ices. Local f ield
of f ices, strategically established in cit ies and towns across the country, translate this new
inf ormation into actual voter contacts. At their most basic level, f ield of f ices serve as the
point of  contact between campaigns and ordinary voters. Campaigns send inf ormation on likely voter
targets to f ield of f ices, which then dispatch their most ef f ective messengers—local, well- trained volunteers
—to target appeals to their chosen voters.
In recent research, we asked: where do campaigns choose to invest in f ield of f ices; and what are the
ef f ects (if  any) of  f ield of f ices on voter behavior? We f ind that Democrats and Republicans have dif f ering
f ield of f ice allocation strategies and f ield of f ices increase turnout and a candidate’s vote share in areas
where they are located.
The places in which campaigns choose to invest can shed light on their perceived path to victory. Do
campaigns choose to “run up the score” in f riendly “core” areas, try to win contested “swing” areas, or
make inroads into their opponent’s territory? We use data f rom the 2012 presidential election to address
these questions. Figures 1 and 2 depict where campaigns chose to open f ield of f ices in 2012.
Figure 1: Obama field off ices, 2012
Figure 2: Romney f ield off ices, 2012
Unsurprisingly, most (though not all) f ield of f ices were located in battleground states. Both the Barack
Obama and Mitt Romney campaigns invested more heavily in their core counties, trying to turn out their
voters where they were most plentif ul. In the case of  swing counties, however, Obama and Romney’s
strategies diverged. Romney avoided Democratic areas almost completely, while Obama invested roughly
equally in swing and Republican core counties. When Obama opened an of f ice in a swing county, so did
Romney. But a Romney of f ice did not necessarily prompt Obama to open an of f ice there. These strategic
dif f erences could be due to demographic and geographic f actors—Democratic voters tend to be more
highly concentrated in large cit ies—but they might ref lect the well-publicized data (and f inancial) disparity
between the campaigns. If  Obama’s campaign was better at using data to f ind the f ew Democrats in largely
Republican counties, they may have been more willing to invest in those areas, though more work will be
needed to def init ively establish this point.
Having f ound that campaigns establish f ield of f ices strategically, we turned to the question of  whether they
receive any return on their investment. Using Democratic f ield of f ice placement data f or 2004, 2008, and
2012, we examine the ef f ects of  f ield of f ice placement on turnout and aggregate vote choice. Sparing the
details (though those interested can consult our paper), we f ind a small but signif icant ef f ect of  f ield
of f ices on both turnout and vote choice.
On average, a f ield of f ice in a county increases turnout by 0.4%, and Democratic vote share by
approximately 1%; we also f ind that f ield of f ices are more ef f ective in battleground states than in saf e
states. These results demonstrate that the activit ies centered in f ield of f ices turn out partisan voters, and
they do so where they are expected to be most active—in battleground states. Given the relative stability
of  county- level vote shares (which have an average standard deviation of  3% in the years measured), a 1%
shif t in the desired direction in county- level vote share is a meaningf ul ef f ect of  campaign investment.
When we place these results in their geographic context, their inf luence becomes even more apparent. In
2008, Obama’s f ield of f ices netted him an average of  425 additional voters per county and 275,000
additional voters nationally. Of  these, 200,000 were in battleground states—providing 7% of  his total
margin of  victory in these crit ical states. We calculated that f ield of f ices accounted f or 50% of  Obama’s
margin of  victory in Indiana, and Obama would likely have lost North Carolina but f or his network of  f ield
of f ices and their subsequent voter mobilization.
We also looked at the relative cost of  f ield of f ice operations. Operating a f ield of f ice requires paying rent
and the salary of  the local organizer, as well as obtaining computers f or data entry and providing f ood f or
volunteers. These costs add up: f ield of f ices cost an average of  $21,000 per of f ice, f or a cost-per-
additional-vote total of  nearly $50/vote. This cost-per-vote estimate is signif icantly more expensive than
those in previous studies of  the ef f iciency of  canvassing, but we think it more accurately ref lects the real
costs of  implementing in-person voter contact in campaigns. Previous estimates assumed volunteer
canvassers with no inf rastructure, but our study points out that f or those canvassers to be ef f ective, they
need the f ield of f ice to coordinate their ef f orts. Further, in the era of  billion-dollar polit ical campaigns,
these expenses are minor: f ield operations budgets pale in comparison to advertisements. In-person
mobilization appears to be one of  the more ef f ective expenditures campaigns can make with their limited
resources.
American presidential elections are national battles waged in increasingly local areas. There is more money
to spend on implementing the lessons gained through better data on voter contact operations. As the
continued lobbying operation of  the Obama campaign (i.e., “Organizing f or America”) demonstrates, this
sort of  participation can even endure between election cycles. Though technological change and increased
money are of ten decried as removing people f rom polit ics, campaigns can also use these f orces to
increase volunteerism, polit ical participation, and voter turnout. Face-to-f ace, community-centered voter
contact increases campaigns’ vote share in targeted areas and leaves a local legacy of  volunteers with
polit ically valuable skills.
This article is based on the paper ‘Relying on the Ground Game: The Placement and Effect of Campaign Field
Offices’, in American Politics Research.
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